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Introduction 
 
Attachment theory was pioneered by the British psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John 
Bowlby. Its fundamental tenet is that in order for an infant’s healthy emotional development 
to take place, they need to have a secure relationship with at least one primary attachment 
figure – a consistently present and emotionally available caregiver. Bowlby was medically 
and psychoanalytically trained, but he was significantly informed and inspired by 
evolutionary thinking and ethology. It was this integration of an evolutionary and biological 
approach with a psychoanalytic one that has made Bowlby’s work both so powerful, and at 
times controversial. He described attachment as a universal, evolved process, that infants are 
innately programmed to form attachments. The attachment created between the infant and 
carer early in life not only provides the basis for physical protection and care, it also meets 
the infant’s essential emotional needs, allowing him or her to acquire the capacity for 
mentalizing (the imaginative interpretation of others’ and one’s own mental state), and for the 
infant’s sense of self-agency. As attachment work has developed, many of its findings have 
proved congruent with our growing neurobiological understanding of the brain, as well as 
new thinking on how young children learn, both about the world at large and about their own 
inner, emotional world. As such, attachment is increasingly understood as providing both the 
neurological and the psychological framework for the development of personality. 
Despite John Bowlby’s psychoanalytic background, his biological and apparently 
mechanistic approach to the ways in which early experience and early relationships shape an 
individual’s emotional life caused opposition and eventual schism from the mainstream 
psychoanalytic world. Over the last thirty years, attachment theory has developed 
considerably, and its relationship with psychoanalytic thinking has changed too; it has a 
growing and increasingly sophisticated theoretical and experimental hinterland and an 
extensive research base, with systemised forms of measurement. As attachment research has 
produced a compelling and coherent body of findings, it has been increasingly accepted that 
attachment patterns in infancy fundamentally affect adult relationships and ways of relating. 
This understanding has had fruitful bearing on the way we examine enduring difficulties that 
an individual may manifest in the ways that they relate in others, most notably in the field of 
personality disorder. What is more, in the last decade or so, the gap between psychoanalysis 
and attachment thinking has become conspicuously smaller. This rapprochement has been 
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further helped by the growth of the concept of mentalizing, which combines psychoanalytic 
thinking, attachment theory and recent research on social-cognitive development to shed light 
on the human impulse and capacity to understand and imagine one’s own and other people’s 
thoughts.  The creatively interdisciplinary quality which has always characterised attachment 
theory – its relationship with ethology and evolutionary thinking, cognitive development, and 
its stormy but undeniable connection with psychoanalysis – has been maintained and 
developed in recent years through its relationship with the latest neuroscientific work. Across 
this chapter, we will set out the major principles of attachment theory and the key 
developments in its intellectual history, as well as discussing criticism of attachment theory 
and its relationship with psychoanalysis, and the most current innovations in attachment 
theory and mentalizing.  
 
History 
John Bowlby, who was born in London in 1907, trained as a psychiatrist and a 
psychoanalyst. In his early twenties, between finishing his undergraduate degree at 
Cambridge and beginning his medical training, he worked as a teacher; most significant for 
him were the six months he spent at a progressive school for maladjusted children, Priory 
Gate. He said later of this experience, ‘… when I was there I learned everything that I have 
known; it was the most valuable six months of my life, really’ (Kraemer et al., 2007). It was 
through the children that Bowlby met here that he first started to make his observations about 
the intense importance of the relationship between child and mother, and the effects that 
deprivation in maternal care can have on children, both in terms of their immediate distress 
and their long-term behaviour and mental health. It was this fascination with how and why 
the mother-figure (or primary caregiver as we would now describe it) matters so much that 
shaped Bowlby’s life’s work. 
On his return to London for his medical training, Bowlby, partly influenced by his 
experiences at Priory Gate, began his psychoanalytic training.  His continuing work with 
deprived and delinquent children in the 1930s and 1940s led to his being commissioned by 
the World Health Organization to write a report on the effects of institutionalization on young 
children. Maternal Care and Mental Health was published in 1951 and laid out Bowlby’s 
thinking on maternal deprivation, presenting evidence for how ‘when deprived of maternal 
care, the child’s development is almost always retarded – physically, intellectually and 
socially – and that symptoms of physical and mental illness may appear’ (Bowlby, 1951, p. 
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15). He cited – in a fascinating precursor to the seminal research on attachment in Romanian 
orphanages in the 1990s – studies of rates of babbling and crying in babies in orphanages, 
which demonstrated that institutionalised infants were, by the age of 2 months, measurably 
less vocal than their counterparts in families. 
In 1946, Bowlby became Deputy Director of the Tavistock Clinic in London, and 
Director of its Children’s department, which, he renamed the Department for Children and 
Parents (Bretherton, 1992). It was his perspective on the significance of the infant’s maternal 
environment that first opened a rift with psychoanalytic thinking. Although Bowlby had 
trained as psychoanalyst in the tradition of Melanie Klein (his training analyst was Joan 
Riviere, an influential Kleinian theorist, and his later analytical supervisor was Melanie Klein 
herself), Bowlby’s put increasing emphasis on the effect of a child’s emotional environment – 
in contrast to the Kleinian emphasis on the child’s internal phantasies as a driver of psychic 
development, or the Freudian emphasis on the infant’s desire for its mother being driven by 
the sensuous seeking of oral gratification.  
The impact of separation from a primary attachment figure became an early focal 
point for attachment thinking – famously depicted in the film A Two-Year-Old Goes to 
Hospital, an account of the devastating impact of parental separation for a young child. Made 
by the psychoanalyst and social worker James Robertson, it is a painfully forensic depiction 
of the toddler’s distress and descent into despairing listlessness across an eight-day hospital 
stay without her mother. The film had so much resonance partly because the effects of 
separation had hitherto been so little considered in social care and medical practice. The 
dominance of secondary drive theory – which posited that an infant’s desire for proximity 
with its primary caregiver was driven by their association with providing food and physical 
care – led to the conclusion that as long as the infant received consistent sustenance and 
physical protection elsewhere, they would be able to adapt smoothly to changing 
circumstances. Although contentiously received (some psychoanalysts pointed out, for 
example, that the child’s mother was pregnant, and that the child’s desperation may have 
derived from her feelings about this), the film paved the way for a rethinking of the way 
hospitalization and institutionalization should be managed for young children. The film, 
which was very basically and naturalistically shot, showed the visceral reality of attachment 
needs, as a primitive and defining prerequisite for emotional health in infancy.  
Across the 1950s, Bowlby’s thinking further evolved away from a psychoanalytic 
approach through the influence of animal behaviourists, such as Konrad Lorenz and Robert 
Hinde. Lorenz’s work on imprinting in geese and other birds – showing how a young animal, 
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at the right developmental window, is susceptible to learning behavioural traits from its 
parent – resonated with Bowlby’s fascination with teasing out all the wider implications of 
the infant-caregiver relationship. Particularly relevant was Lorenz’s observation that young 
geese would follow – become attached to – parents, or even objects, even though they did not 
feed them, if they were exposed to these objects at the right developmental moment (hence 
the famous black and white film footage of a lanky Lorenz trotting round a garden being 
followed by a small flock of eager goslings). Similarly, Harry Harlow’s experiment with 
infant rhesus monkeys observed that when distressed the monkeys sought comfort not from 
their metallic, mechanically feeding ‘mother’ but from the inert but soft, clothed object also 
placed in their cage. These findings were significant as a riposte to the commonly held view 
that a young baby’s interest in his or her mother was primarily motivated by the need for food 
(cupboard love as the shorthand had it) or the seeking of pleasurable sensation which 
becomes associated with the mother’s presence. Partly bolstered by ethological findings, 
Bowlby concluded that the infant’s drive to be close to its mother was a biological need in 
itself, not a secondary drive arising from other physical desires. Bowlby took an evolutionary 
perspective on a child’s emotional and cognitive developmental imperatives, as well as its 
most basic physical needs. Through his on-going, mutually enriching, intellectual 
collaboration with the influential Cambridge ethologist Robert Hinde, Bowlby widened the 
idea of the biological and evolutionary perspective on infancy to encompass the 
developmental requirement for emotional closeness and psychic support. 
Bowlby developed his thinking on attachment substantially across the 1950s, 
presenting three important papers to the British Psychoanalytic Society which laid the basis 
for attachment theory (Bretherton, 1992). His first paper was ‘The Nature of the Child’s Tie 
to his Mother’ (Bowlby, 1958), followed by ‘Separation Anxiety’ (Bowlby, 1959) and ‘Grief 
and Mourning in Infancy and Early Childhood’ (Bowlby, 1960). Published at a period when 
the two main opposing schools of British psychoanalytic thinking, Melanie Klein’s grouping 
and the more classically Freudian grouping (under the leadership of Freud’s daughter Anna 
Freud), were divided over theoretical differences about the intellectual legacy of Sigmund 
Freud, Bowlby simultaneously enraged both factions with his rejection of the physical, 
sensuous nature of the infant’s desire for maternal contact. The initial paper was Bowlby’s 
first major presentation of his belief that psychoanalysts under-appreciated the significance of 
the infant-mother tie in early life. Although this initial sally was conducted with a certain 
well-mannered whiggishness – Bowlby appealed to Freud’s movement towards a greater 
appreciation of the centrality of the emotional nuances of this early relationship towards the 
6 
 
end of his life – the results were nevertheless explosive in psychoanalytic circles; for once the 
Freudians and Kleinians were united in dismay at Bowlby’s intellectual heresy. 
All the same, Bowlby remained a lifelong member of the British Psychoanalytic 
Society, and he also maintained that ‘a great number of the central concepts of my schema 
are to be found plainly stated in Freud’ (Kraemer et al., 2007, p.305).  Looking at Bowlby’s 
work now, we can see that one of his great contributions was his creative integration of the 
work of the two great thinkers who preceded him, Freud and Darwin (Bowlby’s final work 
was a biography of Charles Darwin). The question of Freud’s intellectual legacy was, in the 
1950s however, a hotly contentious and divisive enough issue within mainstream 
psychoanalysis; Bowlby’s rather maverick appropriation of Freudian thinking was beyond the 
pale.  
Bowlby substantially expanded and enriched his theory in the trilogy of books, 
Attachment (Bowlby, 1969), Separation (Bowlby, 1973) and Loss (Bowlby, 1980). Across 
these three texts, Bowlby set out his full elaboration of attachment theory, starting with the 
evolutionary basis for attachment using ethological as well as human examples. Attachment 
was described as a form of behaviour which the infant adapts according to environmental 
stimuli. Attachment behaviours are actions which  infants use to bring about proximity with 
the caregiver (these can be crying, smiling, vocalising, or as the infant becomes mobile, 
physically approaching and following the caregiver). Taken together, such actions constitute 
a behavioural system – in other words, an inherently motivated, evolutionarily driven set of 
behaviours. The innate quality of the need for attachment is indicated by the fact that infants 
still attach to mothers who maltreat or neglect them, a notion harder to square with secondary 
drive theory. As a biological driven need, almost all infants form an attachment, but in 
response to the signals supplied by the attachment figure, the infant develops their own 
pattern of relating, or attachment style.  
The ultimate function of the attachment system is evolutionary, but its repercussions 
are subtle and wide-ranging. The signals and quality of the exchanges provided by the 
attachment figure forge internal working models (IWMs) – expectations and perceptions of 
the self and of others – which persistently shape the tenor of emotional/social interactions: 
‘In the working model of the world that anyone builds a key feature is his notion of 
who his attachment figures are, where they may be found, and how they may be 
expected to respond. Similarly, in the working model of the self that anyone builds a 
key feature is his notion of how acceptable or unacceptable he is in the eyes of his 
attachment figures.’ Separation (Bowlby, 1973, p.203) 
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Bowlby more fully elucidated the concept of the IWM across the last two volumes of his 
trilogy, Separation and Loss. He described the IWM as the mechanism via which attachment 
was transmitted across the generations. A care-giver who acquired a stable, healthy IWM 
through their own experiences in childhood can help the infants for whom they care to build 
their own IWM which is autonomous, self-protective and able to relate to others. Through the 
working model, Bowlby conceptualized a more complex and subtle model for the psyche 
than is sometime recognized in more simplistic depictions of attachment theory. The mental 
representations that a person constructs, through their IWMs, particularly in relation to 
themselves and attachment figures, are central to how they expect others to behave, and how 
they might be predicted to respond to other people’s behaviour. In Loss, Bowlby described 
how experiences – often involving other people’s emotional states or attachment needs – that 
are not compatible with the IWM are defended against and disregarded. This led to a new 
exploration – through the attachment model – of repression and dissociative phenomena, 
which most typically occur with the deactivation of the attachment system in a disorganised 
individual dealing with grief.   
Key developments: The Strange Situation and the Adult Attachment Interview 
Bowlby’s work on attachment was substantially developed, empirically and 
theoretically, by the work of the Canadian developmental psychologist, Mary Ainsworth 
(1913-1990). Ainsworth worked for a time with Bowlby at the Tavistock in the early 1950s 
before performing observational studies of maternal-infant interaction while based in 
Kampala, Uganda and in Baltimore in the United States.  Ainsworth’s close observation of 
maternal patterns of behaviour towards and interactions with their children showed 
significant individual differences. In the Baltimore study in particular, Ainsworth undertook a 
beautifully observant and meticulous study of the ways in which maternal styles and maternal 
sensitivity in the early months of life correlated with smoother and more harmonious 
interactions at around 12 months (Bretherton, 1992).   
In the 1970s, Ainsworth and colleagues developed the Strange Situation protocol, 
which was designed to assess attachment behaviour in infants in a standardised way.  The 
Strange Situation takes a vignette from the drama of a toddler’s everyday life– exploring new 
toys, meeting strangers and seeking reassurance from caregivers – and formalises it into a 
compellingly revealing account of the infant-caregiver dyad. During this procedure, which 
takes about 20 minutes from start to finish, a mother and infant are introduced into an 
unfamiliar playroom. To start with the mother and child are left alone and the child is free to 
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explore; the mother is asked to watch and quietly engage, but not lead this exploration and 
play. A stranger (usually a woman) then enters the room, exchanges a few words with the 
mother before approaching the infant, at which point the mother discreetly exits, leaving the 
infant with the stranger, who interacts with the child and seeks to encourage play. The parent 
then returns, and is reunited with and comforts the infant, at which point the stranger slips 
out. Having reassured the infant, the parent then leaves the room, leaving the infant altogether 
on its own. At this point the stranger returns and attempts to engage with the child (who by 
this point is often rather upset and bewildered). Finally the parent returns to the room and 
comforts the child and the stranger again discreetly leaves.  
From their first experiences of the Strange Situation, Ainsworth and her colleagues 
were particularly struck by the differences in the ways that infants responded to their mothers 
when they were reunited. Most of the infants were quickly and easily comforted, despite 
often having been quite distressed moments before, whereas others would express anger or 
frustration with the mother, or they would allow the mother to comfort them, but would not 
tolerate a full embrace. Others still would appear disinterested, even cold-shoulder their 
mother on their return.  As this work went on, it became increasingly apparent that infants 
were consistently displaying particular behaviours, or styles of behaviour, in response to 
particular parenting styles. 
These different styles of response to the Strange Situation were categorised into three 
patterns: secure; avoidant; and, resistant or ambivalent. Further work by Mary Main and 
colleagues at Berkeley in the 1980s revealed a fourth pattern, disorganized attachment. 
According to these patterns, a securely attached infant (who normally constitute 
approximately the two-third majority of a non-clinical population) quickly starts to play in 
the primary caregiver’s presence, is tentative around the stranger, and is upset and often 
tearful at their caregiver’s absence. They may accept a degree of comfort from the stranger, 
but show a clear preference for their caregiver, and are easily comforted by their care-giver 
on their return. A securely attached child firmly expects their distress to be met with comfort 
and reassurance. 
An avoidant infant appears unconcerned at their carer’s disappearance, may not seek 
contact with the caregiver on their return, and may not seem to prefer the caregiver to the 
stranger. An avoidant individual has adapted to less responsive caregiving by deactivating 
their attachment system, learning not to use attachment behaviours to solicit comfort and 
9 
 
obtain proximity from their carer, instead seeking to manage alone. A resistant infant tends to 
keep their focus on their caregiver rather than immersing him or herself in exploration and 
play when they are first introduced to the playroom; seems highly distressed by the 
separation; and is not easily comforted on being reunited with the carer. Resistant attachment 
involves the hyperactivation of attachment behaviours; the infants tend to display high levels 
of vigilance towards possible attachment threats, and seek reassurance in a particularly urgent 
manner. A disoriented/disorganized infant is so-called because of their unusual attachment 
behaviour, which seems to suggest a breakdown, freezing or disorientation when faced with 
their own attachment needs. This may manifest itself in apparently chaotic or surprising 
behaviours such as becoming very still; stereotypical actions such as head banging; or simply 
appearing frightened of the parent. 
Building on this work with infants, further studies were undertaken in the 1980s to see 
how different attachments styles and behaviours are shown by adults. Attachment styles were 
found to be relatively enduring across life, with significant implications for thinking about the 
role of attachment in personality development. Attachment in adults was first rendered 
measurable when Mary Main, Carol George and Nancy Kaplan produced the Adult 
Attachment Interview (AAI) in 1984. The AAI is a semi-structured interview which asks 
subjects to describe their childhood experiences that relate to attachment, and to consider how 
these experiences might affect their relationships and their functioning as adults. 
Corresponding with the classifications for infancy, adult attachment styles are 
categorized as secure/autonomous, avoidant/dismissing, anxious/preoccupied and 
unresolved/disorganized. An adult who is secure/autonomous during the AAI coherently 
integrates attachment memories into a meaningful narrative and shows appreciation for the 
importance of attachment relationships. Avoidant/dismissing AAI narratives will be less 
coherent: patients will be unable to recall specific memories in support of general arguments 
and will idealize or devalue their early relationships. Anxious/preoccupied adults will also 
show a lack of coherence, and will express confusion, anger, or fear in relation to early 
attachment figures. Unresolved/disorganized adult’s narratives, particularly on the subject of 
bereavements or childhood traumas, will contain lapses in reasoning or expression, such as 
non sequiturs, and exaggerated, unnecessary detail, or changes in register and uncharacteristic 
grammatical mistakes. The unresolved state has been described as a temporary breakdown of 
attention when distracted by traumatic memories, whether during the AAI or through 
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interacting with an infant. Adults showing this pattern are also classified within one of the 
three primary categories.  
The persistent quality of attachment styles produces similarly enduring strategies for 
dealing with emotions and social contact.  For example, the increased sense of agency of the 
secure child permits him/her to move toward the ownership of inner experience, and towards 
an understanding of self and others as intentional beings whose behaviour is organized by 
reasonably predictable mental states, thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires.  Longitudinal 
research indicates that securely attached children are rated as more resilient, self-reliant, 
socially oriented, and empathic to distress, and tend to have higher self-esteem.  Securely 
attached individuals are able to invest trust in their attachment figures and  do not 
overestimate environmental threat; they can respond proportionately to emotional and social 
challenges.   
Dismissing individuals may have a higher tolerance for experiencing negative 
emotions, while preoccupied individuals are likely to have a lower threshold for perceiving 
environmental threat and, therefore, stress.  This is likely to contribute to frequent activation 
of the attachment system, with the concomitant distress and anger such activation can cause 
likely to manifest as compulsive care-seeking and over-dependency.  
Unresolved/disorganized individuals – the adult analogue of disorganized/disoriented infants 
– frequently have parents who are themselves abusive or unresolved regarding their own 
losses or abuse experiences. 
Evidence linking attachment in infancy with more general personality characteristics 
is stronger in some studies than in others.  Findings from the Minnesota Study cohort indicate 
a correlation between infantile attachment insecurity and adult measures of psychiatric 
morbidity, with many potential confounding factors controlled for, linking insecurity and 
adversity to indications of personality disorder (Carlson et al., 2009). However, in contrast to 
Bowlby’s prediction, the avoidant and resistant classifications tend not to be strongly related 
to later measures of maladaptation.  The disorganized/disoriented infant category appears to 
be most strongly associated with psychological disturbance (Fearon, 2010), although there is 
also some evidence to suggest a connection between avoidance and internalizing conditions 
(depression and anxiety) (Groh et al., 2012). 
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Criticisms of Attachment Theory 
There has been a history of extensive criticism of attachment theory from within the 
field of psychoanalysis. The common theme of these critiques has been that by requiring 
theoretical constructs to be measurable and by focusing on observable behaviour rather than 
on drives and unconscious fantasy, attachment theory drastically reduces the explanatory 
power of psychoanalytic observations and misses the point of its theory.   The definitive 
review of the first volume of Attachment by George Engel in the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis was remorselessly negative: ‘despite Bowlby’s inexact treatment of 
psychoanalytic theory and the logical fallacies that follow, and his misapplication of general 
systems theory, this is still an important book for psychoanalysts…  Unfortunately Bowlby 
fails as an expositor leaving the reader the task of identifying what has germinal value for 
psychoanalysis’ (Engel, 1971, p.193).  The psychoanalyst Gregory Rochlin was even more 
despairing: ‘The enormous difficulties encountered in attempting to understand the nature of 
a child's earliest relationships, especially with his mother, are never better illustrated than by 
Bowlby's efforts….  His recent turning to studies of primates and control systems in the hope 
that this will be a more rewarding direction may content him but it will disappoint his reader.  
Bowlby can convince only if one grants his broad suppositions, is willing to overlook the 
important distinctions between infants and young primates, and accepts the notion that 
circuitry between living organisms and robots have little to distinguish them’ (Rochlin, 1971, 
p. 506).   
As mentioned above, recent trends have reduced the gulf between attachment and 
psychoanalysis.  One of these is that the psychoanalytic world has become increasingly 
tolerant of heterogeneity. Another factor in this shift has been that the impact of the 
environment, especially the consequences of trauma, have been increasingly embraced by 
psychoanalytic thinking. The emergence of a relational and relationship-focused emphasis in 
modern psychoanalysis in recent decades has particularly resulted in an increasing interest in 
the formative nature of the child’s social environment. This relational orientation has 
inexorably moved psychoanalysts closer to an attachment model, both theoretically and in 
their clinical approach.  
Concern with child’s actual environment was driven by an increasing interest in infant 
development as a legitimate way of explaining differences in adult behaviour.  For example, 
according to objects relation theory, as described by the British psychoanalyst Ronald 
Fairbairn, people are fundamentally driven by relationships and their need for them; the 
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pursuit of relationships is not a secondary by-product of the primary drives for gratification 
described by Freud. Consequently, an infant’s psyche is shaped by its early relationship 
experiences. There are clear congruencies here, then, with attachment theory. As the object 
relations model has emerged as the dominant psychoanalytic paradigm, attachment theory’s 
emphasis on the innate need for a relationship has been regarded as increasingly viable.  Also 
important has been the emergence of neuroscientific data from both animal and human work, 
which has shown the profound impact of early experience on brain development and on 
social and emotional development. This has served to strengthen the common interests of 
psychoanalysts and attachment theorists in infant-parent relationships and the role of early 
experiences in the emergence of emotion regulation.   
Nevertheless, psychoanalytic reservations have remained. Attachment theory’s 
continuing neglect of sexuality in general and infantile sexuality in particular, for example, 
has been raised (Zamanian, 2011), and there are ongoing concerns about the erosion of the 
unique complexity and humanism of the psychoanalytic project in the face of the research-
driven focus of attachment studies (Hoffman, 2009). Such critiques highlight a real and 
fundamental disparity in approach between attachment theory and psychoanalysis: the sense 
that the paradigm-driven schematic constraints of attachment research have resulted in the 
loss of clinical subtlety and the wealth of psychological complexity allowed for by 
psychoanalysis. However, it would be an impoverished understanding of attachment theory to 
portray it as unconcerned with ‘the dynamic unconscious.’ Bowlby’s own later thinking on 
unconscious defences against memories of traumatic separation and loss, for example, and 
the work of other attachment theorists on the defences that unconsciously structure the 
developing personality and capacities for relating, are testament to this.   The major 
difference between Bowlby’s thinking and Freud’s was in Bowlby’s perception of the human 
emotional need for others as innate, universal, and evolutionarily driven. Freud, on the other 
hand, saw the specificities and complexities behind the impulses involved in relationships, 
allowing for an exploration of the mind which more readily allows for the difficult and 
contradictory nature of human subjectivity.  
The use of well-established and easily replicable assessment measures such as the 
Strange Situation protocol and the Adult Attachment Interview has perhaps served to fade out 
some of the subtleties and nuances of Bowlby’s thinking. Inge Bretherton’s work on IWMs, 
for example, has shown attachment theory did seek to engage with internal, symbolic 
processes: the IWM was described as a representation of the self in metaphorical 
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conversation with the other (Bretherton and Munholland, 1999). The internal, psychic power 
of the IWM as expressed by Bowlby was also partly disguised by his antipathy towards the 
psychoanalytic tendency to focus on internal fantasy at the expense of real-life experience. 
Bowlby’s emphasis on how early environmental experiences mould the IWM, does not in 
fact detract from the richness and imaginative complexity of the IWM that each child devises 
from their experiences. As the value of attachment thinking has become well-established, 
empirically, clinically and theoretically, the future of attachment thinking and research seems 
to suggest a further refinement of some of the established thinking and to seek locate 
attachment’s role in a wider story about the formation of subjectivity and selfhood, driven by 
the imperatives of genes and environment – in particular how the social world around us 
teaches us to mentalize, and the level of epistemic trust we learn to invest in our closest 
relationships (to which we will return in the next section).   
Attachment theory has also received feminist criticism. Attachment is in itself not 
gender specific, in that the primary attachment figure can be male or female, and it need not 
be a genetic relation. However, the emphasis on maternal deprivation and the conflation of 
the mother with the normal primary attachment figure, drove a critique of attachment 
thinking which saw it as a means of defining, and limiting, women according to their 
reproductive roles. In particular, the emphasis on the possible consequences of being 
deprived of maternal contact was interpreted as a challenge to the need and desire of women 
to work out of the home environment. In fact, as early as Bowlby’s 1951 WHO report, 
Bowlby was clear that the primary attachment figure was not necessarily the mother herself: 
‘the infant and young child should experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship 
with this mother (or permanent mother substitute) in which both find satisfaction and 
enjoyment’ (Bowlby, 1951, p. 11).  
In the context of Western domestic norms at the time when attachment theory was 
being developed, it was perhaps inevitable that the biological mother was constantly referred 
to as the primary attachment figure. The historian Marga Vicedo, in her recent work on the 
history of attachment theory, has located the power of attachment in the United States in the 
1950s within a hardening of attitudes towards gender roles in a context of rising numbers of 
married women in the workplace, anxiety about increasing levels of divorce and juvenile 
delinquency, and an intellectual environment where women and female identity were being 
increasingly contested (Vicedo, 2011). She points out that Bowlby’s bestselling book, Child 
Care and the Growth of Love (Bowlby, 1953) (based on his WHO report Maternal Care and 
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Mental Health), was published in 1953, the same year that, for example, Alfred Kinsey’s 
groundbreaking book on female sexuality, Sexual Behaviour in the Human Female was first 
published, and Simon de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex was first translated into English 
(Vicedo, 2011, pp.410-411). Vicedo argues that Bowlby’s work put exceptionally strong 
emotional pressure on women as mothers, and reinforced the moral dimension and 
responsibilities of appropriate maternal love by formulating it as a biological imperative 
(Vicedo, 2013).  
Attachment theory is not a static monolith, captured in the stultifying aspic of post-
war cultural preoccupations: aspects of its have been refined, others jettisoned as research has 
progressed and continues to progress. In the following section we look forward to future 
directions in attachment thinking. 
New Developments: mentalizing, attachment and epistemic trust 
A relatively recent concept, mentalizing, has been of some significance in integrating 
psychoanalytic thinking with attachment theory and research.  Mentalizing – defined as the 
impulse to seek to understand, to imagine other people’s thoughts – is one of humanity’s 
most pervasive and powerful characteristics.  The first minds that small children are 
presented with, to wonder about and interpret, are of course those of their most intimate 
family.  Close family – primarily the major attachment figures – provide the earliest 
formative lessons in other people’s thinking, and also, through these people’s reactions, for 
learning about how our thoughts are perceived: who we are imagined to be by others.  The 
mentalizing model is concerned with the caregiver’s understanding and reflection on the 
infant’s internal world; through the lessons in reflection and self-reflection that are part and 
parcel of child-caregiver interaction, mentalizing claims a vital relationship between 
attachment processes and the growth of the child’s capacity to understand interpersonal 
behaviour in terms of mental states (Fonagy et al., 2002).   
The theory of mentalizing grew out of developmental research into the growth of 
understanding of mental states in the self and other.  The mentalizing model was first outlined 
in the context of a large empirical study in which security of infant attachment with each 
parent proved to be strongly predicted not only by that parents’ security of attachment during 
the pregnancy (Fonagy et al., 1991), but even more by the parents’ capacity to understand 
their own childhood relationships with their own parents in terms of states of mind.  The 
capacity to mentalize is a key determinant of self-organization and affect regulation, and it 
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emerges in the context of early attachment relationships.  Mental disorders in general can be 
seen as the mind misinterpreting its own experience of itself and therefore of others.  The 
concept of mentalizing postulates that one’s understanding of others depends on whether 
one’s own mental states were adequately understood by caring, attentive, non-threatening 
adults.  Problems in affect regulation, attentional control, and self-control stemming from 
dysfunctional attachment relationships are mediated through a failure to develop a robust 
mentalizing capacity (Bateman and Fonagy, 2010). 
Mentalizing enables a child to distinguish inner from outer reality, construct 
representations of his or her own mental states from perceptible cues (arousal, behaviour, 
context) and infer and attribute others’ mental states from subtle behavioural and contextual 
cues.  The full development of mentalizing depends on interaction with more mature and 
sensitive minds.  Many studies support the suggestion that secure children are better than 
insecure children at mentalizing (measured as passing theory of mind tasks earlier) (see, e.g., 
de Rosnay and Harris, 2002).  Children with secure attachment relationships assessed by the 
Separation Anxiety Test do better than children with disorganized attachment on a test of 
emotion understanding.  The first of these findings, reported from the London Parent–Child 
Project (Fonagy et al., 1997), found that 82% of children who were secure with the mother in 
the Strange Situation passed Harris’ Belief-Desire-Reasoning Task (which measures an 
individual’s ability to predict someone else’s behaviour based on an understanding of their 
beliefs and desires) at 5.5 years, compared with 50% of those who were avoidant and 33% of 
the small number who were preoccupied.  Findings along these lines are not always 
consistent, but it generally seems that secure attachment and mentalizing are subject to 
similar social influences.   
The caregiver’s capacity for insightfulness and reflective function appears to be 
associated with both secure attachment and mentalizing.  Meins (2001), Oppenheim (2002), 
and Slade (Slade et al., 2005) have sought to link parental mentalizing with the development 
of affect regulation and secure attachment by analyzing interactional narratives between 
parents and children.  Although Meins assessed parents’ quality of narrative about their 
children in real time (while the parents were playing with their children) while Oppenheim’s 
group did this in a more ‘offline’ manner (parents narrating a videotaped interaction), both 
concluded that maternal mentalizing was a more powerful predictor of attachment security 
than, say, global sensitivity.  Meins and colleagues found that mind-related comments by 
caregivers at 6 months predicted attachment security at 12 months (Meins et al., 2001), 
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mentalizing capacity at 45 and 48 months (Meins et al., 2002), and performance in a stream 
of consciousness task at 55 months (Meins et al., 2003).  Oppenheim et al. found that a secure 
caregiver–child relationship was predicted by high levels of mentalizing about the child’s 
behaviour.   
Slade and colleagues (Slade et al., 2005) also observed a strong association between 
infant attachment and the quality of the parent’s mentalizing about the child.  Rather than 
using an episode of observed interaction, Slade and her colleagues used an autobiographical 
memory-based interview about the child, the Parent Development Interview (PDI).  High 
scorers on the PDI’s mentalizing scale are aware of the characteristics of their infant’s mental 
functioning, and they grasp the complex interplay between their own mental states and the 
child’s putative inner experience.  They are likely to have secure relationships with infants 
whom they describe in a mentalizing way.  Low mentalizing mothers were more likely to 
show atypical maternal behaviour on the AMBIANCE (Atypical Maternal Behavior 
Instrument for Assessment and Classification) system, which relates not only to infant 
attachment disorganization but also to unresolved (disorganized) attachment status in the 
mother’s AAI (Grienenberger et al., 2005).   
Taken together, these results suggest that a mentalizing style of parenting might well 
facilitate the development of mentalizing in the child.  Consistent with this is a range of 
findings covering aspects of parenting that have been shown to predict performance on theory 
of mind tasks.  The process of acquiring mentalizing is so ordinary and normal that it may be 
more correct to consider secure attachment as removing obstacles to it, rather than actively 
and directly facilitating its development.  Coherent family discourse characteristic of secure 
attachment helps to generate explanatory schemata by means of which the behaviour of 
others can be understood and predicted.  It is fair to say that, under normal circumstances, 
conversations with frequent accurate elaboration of psychological themes may be the ‘royal 
road’ to understanding minds.  Main’s (2000) groundbreaking work has linked attachment to 
this kind of communication with words.  The key to understanding the interaction of 
attachment with the development of mentalizing may be to look at instances where normally 
available catalysts for mentalizing are absent.   
Maltreatment disorganizes the attachment system.  There is also evidence to suggest 
that, by impeding or distorting open reflective communication between parent and child, 
maltreatment may disrupt mentalizing.  Young maltreated children display certain 
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characteristics indicative of impaired mentalizing: they engage in less symbolic and dyadic 
play; they sometimes fail to show empathy when witnessing distress in other children; they 
have poor affect regulation; they make fewer references to their internal states; and, they 
struggle to understand emotional expressions, particularly facial ones.  Maltreated children 
tend to misattribute anger  and show elevated event-related potentials to angry faces (for a 
comprehensive review, see, Cicchetti and Toth, 2005).   
Maltreatment may disrupt the development of a coherent understanding of the 
connection between internal states and actions in attachment relationships (e.g., the child may 
be told that they ‘deserve’, ‘want’, or even ‘enjoy’ the abuse).  This is liable to be more 
damaging if the maltreatment is perpetrated by a family member.  Even when this is not the 
case, parents’ ignorance of maltreatment taking place outside the home may invalidate the 
child’s communications with the parents about his/her feelings.  The child finds that 
reflective discourse does not correspond to these feelings, a consistent misunderstanding that 
could reduce the child’s ability to understand/mentalize verbal explanations of other people’s 
actions.  In such circumstances, the child is likely to struggle to detect mental states behind 
actions, and will tend to see these actions as inevitable rather than intended.  This formulation 
implies that treatments should aim to engage maltreated children in causally coherent 
psychological discourse.   
Disturbance of attachment relationships, by inhibiting the capacity for mentalizing, 
disrupts key social-cognitive capacities (the ability to conceive mental states as explanations 
for behaviour in oneself and in others) and thus creates profound vulnerabilities in the context 
of social relationships. Difficulties in mentalizing appear to be the developmental mechanism 
for the connection between attachment problems and the enduring difficulties in relating to 
others which characterize personality disorders. Missing out on early attachment experience 
(as was the case for the Romanian orphans) creates a long-term vulnerability from which the 
child may never recover – the capacity for mentalizing is never fully established, leaving the 
child vulnerable to later trauma and unable to cope fully with attachment relationships (e.g., 
Rutter and O'Connor, 2004).  More importantly, by activating attachment, trauma will often 
decouple the capacity for mentalizing.  This, of course, is further exacerbated when the 
trauma is attachment trauma.  The capacity for mentalizing in the context of attachment is 
likely to be in certain respects independent of the capacity to mentalize about interpersonal 
experiences outside the attachment context.  For example, in a quasi-longitudinal study based 
on interviews and chart reviews with young adults, some of whom had suffered trauma, we 
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found that the trauma affected mentalizing in attachment contexts (in this case, adult romantic 
relationships), but mentalizing was not adversely affected when measured independently of 
the attachment context (using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, which measures how 
well an adult can judge mood from a photo of their eye area; it is used as a measure of 
empathy and general capacity to mentalize) (Fonagy et al., 2003).  It seems that measuring 
mentalizing in the context of attachment might measure a unique aspect of social behaviour.   
Insecure and unpredictable attachment relationships between parent and infant may 
create an adverse social environment that limits the infant’s opportunity to acquire ‘mind-
reading’.  But why should evolution allow for such variation if mentalizing is such a valuable 
adaptive capacity?  In social environments where resources are limited, non-mentalizing 
might be adaptive.  The parent’s lack of mirroring behaviour may serve as a signal for limited 
resources, warning the child that they will need to use physical force (even interpersonal 
violence) to survive.  Violence is incompatible with mentalizing: if violence rather than 
collaboration is required to survive, and violence is possible only when we avoid 
contemplating the mental state of the victim, then the child’s lack of mentalizing capacity 
may increase his/her chances of survival.  By contrast, in resource-rich environments, adult 
carer-teachers are in a better position to facilitate the child’s access to subjectivity.  If parent–
child interaction lacks marking, contingency, and other ostensive cues, mentalizing will be 
less firmly established and more readily abandoned under emotional stress. The child may 
then manifest early aggression and conduct problems.  From the point of view of appropriate 
intervention, it is probably more helpful to view this kind of aggression as an understandable 
adaptation rather than demonizing it as an incomprehensible genetic aberration, even if these 
behaviours are primed in some individuals by a very sizeable genetic component acting 
transactionally. 
Linking attachment and mentalizing has been made easier by recent neuroscientific 
research. Neuroimaging studies, for example, have confirmed the association between 
attachment and mentalizing: the dopaminergic reward-processing system and the 
oxytocinergic system have been shown to play a vital role in establishing social bonds and 
regulating emotional behaviour. The role of the dopaminergic reward system in attachment 
behaviour is considered an evolutionary mechanism to motivate reproductive mating, 
maternal care and offspring survival: it leads individuals to seek close relations with other 
humans and produces satisfaction when close relations are achieved. 
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Oxytocin is a neuroactive hormone produced in the hypothalamus and projected to 
brain areas that are associated with emotions and social behaviours. It plays an important role 
in the activation of the dopaminergic reward system and in the deactivation of 
neurobehavioural systems related to social avoidance.  Laboratory animals with a genetic 
mutation rendering them devoid of oxytocin do not develop normally in terms of sociability 
and caregiving. Oxytocin helps promote social behaviour; for example, monkeys without 
oxytocin do not read social cues as well as those with oxytocin, and they fall to the bottom of 
the troop status hierarchy. Oxytocin also promotes the ‘caregiver’s bond’. Female rats 
without oxytocin mother poorly, and this has downstream effects on their female offspring, 
which themselves grow to have limited competence in maternal behaviour. Oxytocin is a 
facilitator of attachment: it enhances sensitivity to social cues, accelerates social 
connectedness (Bartz and Hollander, 2006), improves social memory, and facilitates the 
encoding and retrieval of happy social memories. By attenuating activity in the extended 
amygdala, oxytocin also acts to neutralize negative feelings towards others and enhance trust. 
Oxytocin can inhibit hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activity when the attachment 
system is activated: secure attachment leads to ‘adaptive hypoactivity’ of the HPA axis, 
which, in turn, reduces social anxiety. 
The effects of oxytocin on an individual’s behaviour depend on social circumstances. 
It seems to facilitate prosocial behaviour toward members of the in-group only, and to 
enhance trust towards reliable and neutral peers but not those who have proven to be 
unreliable. Oxytocin, therefore, does not always facilitate trust and prosocial behaviour: its 
behavioural effects are mediated by the social context, personality traits, and the quality of 
early attachment (Simeon et al., 2011).  Similarly, insecure attachment is bound to the 
divergent effects of oxytocin. Oxytocin is found in lower concentrations in maltreated 
children, adults with a history of early separation, and in insecurely attached mothers during 
the puerperal period (Fonagy et al., 2011).  
There are, then, three types of association between aspects of social cognition and 
attachment. (1) Mediated by dopaminergic structures of the reward system in the presence of 
oxytocin and vasopressin, the love-related activation of the attachment system can inhibit the 
neural systems that underpin the generation of negative affect. (2) Threat-related activation of 
the attachment system (e.g., triggered by perceived threat, loss, or harm) may evoke intense 
arousal and overwhelming negative affect, bringing about an activation of posterior cortical 
and subcortical areas and switching off frontal cortical activity including mentalizing. (3) 
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Meanwhile, a secure and predictable attachment relationship may be most effective in pre-
empting threat, which possibly reduces the need for frequent activation of the attachment 
system. 
Disturbance of attachment relationships undermines the acquisition of balanced 
mentalizing abilities, a key social-cognitive capacity,  and thus creates profound 
vulnerabilities in the context of social relationships. Mentalizing clearly has great 
significance in terms of clinical practice: the development of mentalizing based therapy, in 
the first instance for individuals with borderline personality disorder, seeks to improve the 
capacity to mentalize, creating a more stable sense of self, stabilizing relationships and 
strengthening affect regulation. As a theoretical formulation rooted in attachment theory and 
with significant therapeutic applications which are derived from psychoanalytic practice, 
mentalizing provides a practical mechanism for the psychoanalytic integration with 
attachment. 
In the paragraphs above, we have discussed how insecure and unpredictable 
attachment relationships may create an adverse social environment for the acquisition of 
mentalizing. This work is based on the theory of natural pedagogy, which explains how this 
acquisition or learning process is smoother for secure infants: (Csibra and Gergely, 2011) 
(Csibra and Gergely, 2009). Pedagogy theory predicts that young children will initially view 
everything they are taught as generally available cultural knowledge, shared by everyone 
(Csibra and Gergely, 2006): when they learn a new word for something they do not need to 
check everyone else knows this word. Similarly, young children assume that knowledge of 
subjective states is shared and that their thoughts or feelings are not separate or unique; only 
gradually do they learn a sense of the uniqueness of their own perspective.  
The establishment of subjectivity is linked to attachment via the experience of 
consistent ostensive and accurate referential cueing, which in most nornative experience 
would be experienced via what attachment theorist describe as ‘sensitive parenting’. By 
providing second-order representations on the one hand, and modelling mental reasoning 
schemes to make sense of action on the other, the relationship with the mind-minded 
reflective caregiver transforms the child’s implicit and automatic mentalizing into an explicit, 
potentially verbally expressible, and systematized ‘theory of mind’. Aspects of secure 
attachment such as attunement sensitivity serve to teach us what we cannot learn about the 
world by simple observation:  subjectivity is a clear example of this kind epistemically 
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opaque phenomenon. Secure attachment and mind-minded reflective mirroring from 
caregivers build awareness to include internal states, eventually making self-prediction and 
emotional self-control possible. The benign effects of secure attachment arise at least in part 
out of superior competence at ostensive cuing in the infant’s environment: the caregiver is 
able to mentalize the infant, and by appropriately responding and mirroring the infant’s state, 
the infant can learn about their own subjective self. 
Secure attachment and skilled mentalizing also assist the infant in another problem 
that arises in relation to learning: protecting oneself from misinformation from individuals 
who, whether through hostile intent, competition or indifference, do not have a shared 
investment in the juvenile’s learning. It is adaptive to adopt a vigilant stance towards 
unproven or untrustworthy sources. By the age of 3–4-year, children become aware not only 
that knowledge is not invariably shared, but also that it is not necessarily communicated with 
benign intent. In one study, preschool children responded differentially to information 
supplied by a ‘good guy’ versus a ‘bad guy’. Passing the false-belief test – that is, ‘having a 
theory of mind’ – was associated with sensitivity to information coming from positively 
versus negatively connoted sources (Wilson and Sperber, 2012).  
 As learning is triggered by ostensive cues that share characteristics with secure 
parenting, the teaching of secure infants may be smoother than that of insecure ones. By 
contrast, disorganized attachment interferes with ostensive cues and would be expected to 
disrupt learning. It is expected that the influence of secure attachment will be particularly 
crucial in teaching the infant about his/her own subjectivity. Finally, the characteristics of 
communication associated with sensitive caregiving also reassure the infant about the 
trustworthiness of the information to be communicated. From an evolutionary standpoint, we 
may consider such ostensive cues (at least in infancy) to trigger a ‘basic epistemic trust’ in 
the caregiver as a benevolent, cooperative, and reliable source of cultural information 
(Gergely, 2007). This basic trust enables the infant to rapidly learn what is communicated 
without the need to test for social trustworthiness. Adults mainly teach infants they look after, 
for whom they have genetic reasons to care. Infants  preferentially select their attachment 
figures to teach them what in the world is safe and trustworthy, but, further, to teach them 
how they can make sense of their own thoughts and feelings, and how knowledge of such 
internal states can help them navigate the wider social world (Fonagy et al., 2014, Fonagy 
and Allison, 2014). In terms of thinking about psychopathology, the interaction between 
attachment, mentalizing and epistemic trust relates to the experience of a breakdown in 
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epistemic trust – the disruption or closing down of the channels learning about the social 
environment – as a result of social adversity, especially attachment trauma.   We suggest that 
epistemic mistrust may be the general factor that underlies the severity and entrenchment of 
psychopathology; and that this may be a more productive approach to understanding 
psychopathology than the discrete diagnostic categories that currently shape approaches to 
mental illness, but fail to capture the variability and symptomatic complexity of individuals’ 
experiences of psychopathology across the lifecourse. 
Conclusion 
Secure attachment involves the firm expectation of distress being met with comfort and 
reassurance.  But further, because secure attachment facilitates the emergence of psychic 
structures linked to emotion, an individual’s entire representational system is likely to be 
more stable and coherent with a history of generally secure attachment experiences.  The way 
we experience thoughts, including attachment-related thoughts and the cognitive structures 
that underpin these, may be seen as linked to physical aspects of early infantile experience.  
We now see insecure patterns of attachment as adaptations that maximize the chances of 
survival of the infant to reproductive maturity despite adverse conditions for child-rearing.   
In that sense, attachment – according to latest developments in our thinking – might best be 
understood as a form of adaptive social learning transmitted from primary caregivers about 
how best to navigate their particular social environment, with all its cultural and material 
complexities and challenges. This development in our thinking represents a turning toward 
the role of communication, and the communication of social understanding that is tailored to 
maximise the individual’s functioning in their particular setting, as key to understanding the 
complexity of human subjectivity and psychopathology. Classical psychoanalytic thinking 
was concerned with the role of drives – particularly sex and aggression - and the unconscious 
motivations relating to them that shape the psyche; later twentieth century psychoanalytic 
thinking has emphasized the role of interpersonal relationships and their intrapsychic 
counterparts, again often unconsciously. We suggest that the acquisition of mentalizing and 
the development of epistemic trust in social communication, which in most normative human 
experience occurs in the context of early relationships with primary caregivers, may 
constitute a fruitful future focus for thinking about psychopathology and development. Such 
an approach may speak to some of the psychoanalytic criticism of the failure of attachment 
thinking to accommodate the full complexity of individual subjectivity. It also speaks to a 
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criticism that has been aimed at both attachment and psychoanalysis, their perceived failure 
to truly accommodate the complexity of cultural differences.  
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